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Abstract. We consider MultiCriteria Decision Analysis models which are de-
fined over discrete attributes, taking a finite number of values. We do not assume
that the model is monotonically increasing with respect to the attributes values.
Our aim is to define an importance index for such general models, considering
that they are equivalent to k-ary games (multichoice games). We show that clas-
sical solutions like the Shapley value are not suitable for such models, essentially
because of the efficiency axiom which does not make sense in this context. We
propose an importance index which is a kind of average variation of the model
along the attributes. We give an axiomatic characterization of it.
Keywords: MultiCriteria Decision Analysis · k-ary game · Shapley value.
1 Introduction
In MultiCriteria Decision Analysis (MCDA), a central question is to determine the im-
portance of attributes or criteria. Suppose the preference of a decision maker has been
represented by a numerical model. For interpretation and explanation purpose of the
model, a basic requirement is to be able to assess the importance of each attribute. If
this is easy for a number of elementary models (essentially additive ones), it becomes
more challenging with complex models.
For models based on the Choquet integral w.r.t. a capacity or fuzzy measure (see a
survey in [8]), it has been recognized since a long time ago that the Shapley value [17],
a concept borrowed from game theory, is the adequate tool to quantify the importance
of attributes.
Choquet integral-based models belong to the category of decomposable models,
that is, where utility functions are defined on each attribute, and then are aggregated by
some increasing function. In this paper, we depart from this kind of models and focus
on models where there is no such separation of utilities among the attributes. Typically,
the Generalized Additive Independence (GAI) model proposed by Fishburn [4,5] is of
this type, since of the form U(x) =
∑
S∈S uS(xS), where S is a collection of subsets
ofN , the index set of all attributes. In this paper, however, we do not take advantage of
this peculiar form, and consider a numerical model without particular properties, except
that the underlying attributes are discrete, and thus take a finite number of values. Note
that in many applications, especially in the AI field, this is the case, in particular for
GAI models [1,6,2].
As far as we know, the question of the definition of an importance index for such
a general case remains open. As we will explain, discrete models can be seen as k-ary
capacities or more generally k-ary games [9] (also called multichoice games [11]), and
thus it seems natural to take as importance index the various definitions of Shapley-
like values for multichoice games existing in the literature. There is however a major
drawback inherent to these values: they all satisfy the efficiency axiom, that is, the
sum of the importance indices over all attributes is equal to v(kN ), the value of the
game when all attributes take the highest value. If this axiom is natural in a context of
cooperative game, where the Shapley value defines a rational way to share among the
players the total benefit v(kN ) of the game, it has no justification in MCDA, especially
if the model v is not monotone increasing.
The approachwe propose here is inspired by the calculus of variations: we define the
importance index of an attribute as the average variation of v (depicting the satisfaction
of the decision maker) when the value of attribute i is increased by one unit. We propose
an axiomatic definition, where the chosen axioms are close to those of the original
Shapley value.
Section 2 recalls the basic concepts. Section 3 informally defines what is the aim
of our importance index. The axiomatic characterization is presented in Section 4. The
new index is then interpreted (Section 5). Finally we compare our approach to related
works (Section 6).
2 Preliminaries
Throughout the paper, N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set which can be thought as the set
of attributes (in MCDA), players (in cooperative game theory), etc., depending on the
application. In this paper, we will mainly focus on MCDA applications. Cardinality of
sets will be often denoted by corresponding lower case letters, e.g., n for |N |, s for |S|,
etc.
The set of all possible values taken by attribute i ∈ N is denoted by Li. As it is
often the case in MCDA, we assume that these sets are finite, and we represent them by
integer values, i.e., Li = {0, 1, . . . , ki}. Alternatives are thus elements of the Cartesian
product L = ×i∈NLi and take the form x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) with xi ∈ Li, i =
1, . . . , n. For x, y ∈ L, we write x ≤ y if xi ≤ yi for every i ∈ N . For S ⊆ N
and x ∈ L, xS is the restriction of x to S. L−i is a shorthand for ×j 6=iLj . For each
y−i ∈ L−i, and any ℓ ∈ Li, (y−i, ℓi) denotes the combined alternative x such that
xi = ℓi and xj = yj , ∀j 6= i. The vector 0N = (0, . . . , 0) is the null alternative of
L, and kN = (k
1
1 , . . . , k
n
n) is the top element of L. 0−i denotes the element of L−i in
which all coordinates are zero. We call vertex of L any element x ∈ L such that xi is
either 0 or ki, for each i ∈ N . We denote by Γ (L) = ×i∈N{0, ki} the set of vertices
of L. For each x ∈ L, we denote by S(x) = {i ∈ N | xi > 0} the support of x, and by
K(x) = {i ∈ N | xi = ki} the kernel of x. Their cardinalities are respectively denoted
by s(x) and k(x).
We suppose to have a numerical representation v : L → R of the preference of
the decision maker (DM) over the set of alternatives in L. For the sake of generality,
we do not make any assumption on v, except that v(0N ) = 0 (this is not a restriction,
as most of numerical representations are unique up to a positive affine transformation).
In particular, there is no assumption of monotonicity, that is, we do not assume that
x1 ≥ x
′
1,. . . , xn ≥ x
′
n implies v(x1, . . . , xn) ≥ v(x
′
1, . . . , x
′
n). Example 1 below
illustrates that it is quite common to observe this lack of monotonicity.
Example 1. The level of comfort of humans depends on three main attributes: tem-
perature of the air (X1), humidity of the air (X2) and velocity of the air (X3). Then
v(x1, x2, x3) measures the comfort level. One can readily see that v is not monotone
in its three arguments. For x2 and x3 fixed, v is maximal for intermediate values of the
temperature (typically around 23◦C). Similarly, the value of humidity maximizing v is
neither too low nor too high. Finally, for x1 relatively large, some wind is well appre-
ciated, but not too much. Hence for any i, and supposing the other two attributes being
fixed, there exists an optimal value ℓ̂i ∈ Li such that v is increasing in xi below ℓ̂i, and
then decreasing in xi above ℓ̂i.
Althoughwe will not use this specific form for v in the sequel, we mention as typical
example of a model not necessarily satisfying monotonicity the Generalized Additive
Independence (GAI) model, i.e., v is written as v(x) =
∑
S∈S vS(xS), where S is a
collection of subsets of N [4,5]. This model has been widely used in AI [1,6,2].
For convenience, we assume from now on that all attributes have the same number
of elements, i.e., ki = k for every i ∈ N (k ∈ N). Note that if this is not the case, k is
set to maxi∈N k
i, and we duplicate some elements of Li when k
i < k. A fundamental
observation is that when k = 1, v is nothing other than a pseudo-Boolean function
v : {0, 1}N → R vanishing on 0N , or put otherwise via the identity between sets and
their characteristic functions, a (cooperative) game (in characteristic form) µ : 2N →
R, with µ(∅) = 0. A game v is monotone if v(A) ≤ v(B) whenever A ⊆ B. A
monotonic game is called a capacity [3] or fuzzy measure [18]. For the general case
k ≥ 1, v : L → R is called a multichoice game or k-ary game [11], and the numbers
0, 1, . . . , k in Li are seen as the level of activity of the players. By analogy with the
classical case k = 1, a k-ary capacity is a monotone k-ary game, i.e., satisfying v(x) ≤
v(y) whenever x ≤ y, for each x, y ∈ L [9]. Hence, a k-ary capacity represents a
preference on L which is increasing with the value of the attributes. We denote by G(L)
the set of k-ary games defined on L.
The Mo¨bius transform of a k-ary game v is a mapping mv : L → R which is the
unique solution of the linear system (cf. [16])
v(x) =
∑
y≤x
mv(y), x ∈ L. (1)
Its solution is given bymv(x) =
∑
y≤x
xi−yi≤1, ∀i∈N
(−1)
∑
i∈N
(xi−yi)v(y), x ∈ L.
By analogy with classical games, a unanimity game for k-ary game denoted ux, for
each x ∈ L with x 6= 0N is defined by
ux(y) =
{
1, if y ≥ x
0, otherwise
Hence, (1) can be rewritten as
v =
∑
x∈L
x 6=0N
mv(x)ux (2)
Note that the set of unanimity games forms a basis of the vector space of k-ary games.
One advantage of unanimity games is that they are monotone. Hence this basis is rele-
vant for k-ary capacities. In order to obtain a basis of k-ary games not necessarily made
of monotone functions, we define for each x ∈ L such that x 6= 0N , the game δx by
δx(y) =
{
1, if y = x
0, otherwise
It is obvious that any k-ary game v can be written as
v =
∑
x∈L
x 6=0N
v(x)δx. (3)
3 Definition of an importance index: what do we aim at doing?
When dealing with numerical representations of preference in MCDA, one of the pri-
mary concerns is to give an interpretation of the model in terms of importance of the
attributes. When v is a capacity or a game (k = 1), or with continuous models extend-
ing capacities and games like the Choquet integral, the standard solution is to take the
Shapley value, introduced by Shapley in the context of cooperative games [17]. A value
is a function φ : G(2N ) → RN that assigns to every game µ a payoff vector φ(µ). It
is interpreted in the MCDA context as the vector of importance of the attributes. The
value introduced by Shapley is one of the most popular, and is defined by:
φShi (µ) =
∑
S⊆N\i
(n− s− 1)!s!
n!
(
µ(S ∪ i)− µ(S)
)
, ∀i ∈ N. (4)
A standard property shared by many values in the literature is efficiency:
∑
i∈N φi(µ) =
µ(N). This property is very natural in game theory, as µ(N) is the total benefit obtained
from the cooperation of all players in N , and by efficiency the payoff vector φ(v) rep-
resents a sharing of this total benefit.
If the Shapley value has been widely used in MCDA with great success (see, e.g.,
[8]), it must be stressed that it was only in the case of monotonically increasing mod-
els, i.e., based on a capacity µ. In such cases, µ(N) is set to 1, the value of the best
possible alternative, and the importance index of an attribute could be seen as a kind
of contribution of that attribute to the best possible alternative. However if the model is
not monotone increasing, such an interpretation fails. Hence, we are facing here a dou-
ble difficulty: to propose a “value” both valid for k ≥ 1 and for nonincreasing models.
Section 6 presents several definitions found in the literature of a Shapley-like value for
k-ary games. However, all of them satisfy the efficiency axiom.
We wish to capture in our importance index the impact of each attribute on the
overall utility. Let us consider for illustration the game δy with k = 2, n = 3 and
y = (2, 1, 1). Attribute 1 is non-decreasing and has a positive impact on the overall
utility. Attributes 2 and 3 have neither a positive nor a negative impact on the overall
utility, since δy(x) is non-decreasing (resp., non-increasing) when x2 or x3 goes from 0
to 1 (resp., from 1 to 2). Hence, denoting by φ(δy) our importance index for that game,
one shall have φ1(δy) > 0, φ2(δy) = φ3(δy) = 0, so that the sum
∑
i∈N φi(v) > 0
cannot be equal to v(2, 2, 2) − v(0, 0, 0) = 0, and hence φ does not satisfy efficiency.
Rather, the index φi(v) shall measure the impact of attribute i on v, as the total variation
on v if we increase the value of attribute i of one unit (going from value xi to xi + 1),
when x is varying over the domain.
4 Axiomatization
We define in this section an importance index according to the ideas explained above,
by using an axiomatic description. Our axioms are relatively close to the ones used
by Shapley when characterizing his value in [17]: linearity, null player, symmetry and
efficiency. Our approach will followWeber [20], who introduces the axioms one by one
and at each step gives a characterization. Throughout this section, we consider a value
as a mapping φ : G(L)→ R.
The linearity axiom means that if we have the preferences v andw of two DMs, and
the resulting preference is a linear combination of them (yielding v = α v + β w), then
it is equivalent to apply φ before or after the linear combination. Axiom L is also very
helpful in the view of the GAI decomposition.
Linearity axiom (L) : φ is linear on G(L), i.e., ∀v, w ∈ G(L), ∀α ∈ R,
φi(v + αw) = φ(v) + αφ(w).
Proposition 1. Under axiom (L), for all i ∈ N , there exists constants aix ∈ R, for all
x ∈ L, such that ∀v ∈ G(L),
φi(v) =
∑
x∈L
aixv(x) (5)
The proof of this result and the other ones are omitted due to space limitation.
The second axiom that characterizes the Shapley value in [20] is called the null
player axiom. It says that a player i ∈ N who brings no contribution (i.e., µ(S ∪ i) =
µ(S), ∀S ⊆ N\{i}) should receive a zero payoff. This definition can be easily extended
to k-ary games.
Definition 1. A player i ∈ N is said to be null for v ∈ G(L) if
v(x+ 1i) = v(x), ∀x ∈ L, xi < k.
Remark 1. Let i ∈ N be a null player for v ∈ G(L). we have,
∀x ∈ L, v(x−i, xi) = v(x−i, 0i).
If an attribute is null w.r.t. a game v, then this attribute has no influence on v, and hence
the importance of this attribute shall be zero. We propose the following axiom.
Null axiom (N): If a player i is null for v ∈ G(L), then φi(v) = 0.
Proposition 2. Under axioms (N) and (L), for all i ∈ N , there exists pix ∈ R, for all
x ∈ L with xi < k, such that ∀v ∈ G(L),
φi(v) =
∑
x∈L
xi<k
pix
(
v(x + 1i)− v(x)
)
(6)
This proposition shows that φi is a linear combination of the added-values on v, going
from value xi to xi + 1, over all x.
The classical symmetry axiom says that the numbering of the attributes has no in-
fluence on the value. It means that the computation of value should not depend on the
numbering of the attributes.
Let σ be a permutation on N . For all x ∈ L, we denote σ(x)σ(i) = xi. For all
v ∈ G(L), The game σ ◦ v is defined by σ ◦ v(σ(x)) = v(x).
Symmetry axiom (S): For any permutation σ ofN , φσ(i)(σ◦v) = φi(v), ∀i ∈
N.
Proposition 3. Under axioms (N), (L) and (S), ∀v ∈ G(L), ∀i ∈ N ,
φi(v) =
∑
x∈L
xi<k
pxi;n0,...,nk
(
v(x+ 1i)− v(x)
)
where pxi;n0,...,nk ∈ R, and nj is the number of components of x−i being equal to j.
This result means that the coefficients in front of the added-values on v, going from
value xi to xi + 1, do not depend on the precise value of x, but only on the number of
terms of x−i taking values 0, 1, . . . , k.
The next axiom enables an easier computation of coefficients pix while reducing
their number.
Invariance axiom (I): Let us consider two games v, w ∈ G(L) such that, for
all i ∈ N ,
v(x+ 1i)− v(x) = w(x) − w(x − 1i), ∀x ∈ L, xi /∈ {0, k}
v(x−i, 1i)− v(x−i, 0i) = w(x−i, ki)− w(x−i, ki − 1), ∀x−i ∈ L−i.
Then φi(v) = φi(w).
Taking two games v and w for which the differences v(x + 1i)− v(x) (measuring
the added value of improving x of one unit on attribute i) can be deduced from that of
w just by shifting of one unit, then the mean importance of attribute i shall be the same
for v and w. In other words, what is essential is the absolute value of the differences
v(x+ 1i)− v(x) and not the value x at which it occurs.
Proposition 4. Under axioms (L), (N) and (I), ∀v ∈ G(L), ∀i ∈ N ,
φi(v) =
∑
x−i∈L−i
pix−i
(
v(x−i, ki)− v(x−i, 0i)
)
Axiom (I) implies that we only need to look at the difference of v between the extreme
value 0 and k. The evaluatinon on the intermadiate elements of Li do not count.
Proposition 5. Under axioms (L), (N), (I) and (S), ∀v ∈ G(L), ∀i ∈ N ,
φi(v) =
∑
x−i∈L−i
pn(x−i)
(
v(x−i, ki)− v(x−i, 0i)
)
,
where n(x−i) = (n0, n1, . . . , nk) with nj the number of components of x−i being
equal to j.
As explained in Section 3, we do not require that φ satisfy efficiency. In the context
of game theory, φShi (µ) is the amount of money alloted to player i, so that relation∑
i∈N φ
Sh
i (µ) = µ(N) means that all players share among themselves the total worth
µ(N). We have no such interpretation in MCDA. By contrast, we interpret φi(v) as
an overall added value when increasing the value of attribute i of one unit – thereby
going from any point x to (xi + 1, x−i). Hence
∑
i∈N φi(v) can be interpreted as the
overall added value when increasing simultaneously the value of all attributes of one
unit – thereby going from any point x to x+1 = (x1 +1, . . . , xn+1). For an arbitrary
game v, there is a priori no particular property for the previous sum. We thus consider
a very special case of games following Example 1. These games are single peaked.
The simplest version of these games is the family of games δy . For those games, we
immediately see from Proposition 5 that φi(δy) = 0 for every i such that yi 6= 0, k,
as already mentioned in Section 3. Based on this remark, we should only bother on
attributes which are equal to either 0 or k in y. We have therefore three cases (recall that
s(y), k(y) are the cardinalities of the support and kernel of y):
– k(y) 6= 0 and s(y) = n. Then y − 1 ∈ L because no component of y is equal
to 0, and we have δy(y) − δy(y − 1) = 1. Note that δy(x + 1) − δy(x) = 0 for
any x 6= y − 1 and x, x + 1 ∈ L. Therefore, by the above argument, we have∑
i∈N φi(δy) = 1.
– k(y) = 0 and s(y) < n. This is the dual situation: y+1 ∈ L because no component
is equal to k, and we have δy(y + 1)− δy(y) = −1. Since δy(x+ 1)− δy(x) = 0
for any other possible x, we get
∑
i∈N φi(δy) = −1.
– k(y) 6= 0 and s(y) < n. This time there are both components equal to 0 and to k in
y. Therefore, neither y + 1 nor y − 1 belong to L, and for any possible x ∈ L s.t.
x+ 1 ∈ L, we have δy(x+ 1)− δy(x) = 0. Therefore,
∑
i∈N φi(δy) = 0.
To summarize, we shall write
∑
i∈N
φi(δx) =


+1 if k(y) 6= 0 and s(y) = n
−1 if k(y) = 0 and s(y) < n
0 else
This can be written in the following compact form.
Efficiency axiom (E): For all x ∈ L \ 0,∑
i∈N
φi(δx) = δx(x−i, ki)− δx(x−j , 0j)
where, i = argmax x and j = argmin x
Note that the previous formula takes the form of standard efficiency
∑
i∈N φ
Sh
i (µ) =
µ(N)− µ(∅). The final result is the following.
Theorem 1. Under axioms (L), (N), (I), (S) and (E), for all v ∈ G(L)
φi(v) =
∑
x−i∈L−i
(n− s(x−i)− 1)!k(x−i)!
(n+ k(x−i)− s(x−i))!
(
v(x−i, ki)− v(x−i, 0i)
)
, ∀i ∈ N
We note that we have the following relation, for every v ∈ G(L)∑
i∈N
φi(v) =
∑
x∈L
xj<k
(
v(x+ 1)− v(x)
)
.
The right-hand side of this expression corresponds exactly to the interpretation provided
above saying that
∑
i∈N φi(v) is the overall impact of going from any point x to x+1.
5 Interpretation
We propose here an interpretation of φ in continuous spaces, that is, after extending v
to the continuous domain [0, k]N . We consider thus a function U : [0, k]N → R which
extends v: U(x) = v(x) for every x ∈ L. The importance of attribute i can be defined
as (see [14, proposition 5.3.3 page 141])
Impi(U) =
∫
[0,k]n−1
(
U(ki, z−i)− U(0i, z−i)
)
dz−i =
∫
[0,k]n
∂U
∂zi
(z) dz.
In this formula, the local importance of attribute i for function U at point z is equal to
∂U
∂zi
(z). The index Impi(U) appears as the mean of relative amplitude of the range of
U w.r.t. attribute i, when the remaining variables take uniformly random values.
The most usual extension of v on [0, k]N is the Choquet integral with respect to k-
ary capacities [7]. Let us compute Impi in this case. We write Impi(U) =
∑
x∈{0,...,k−1}N∫
[x,x+1]n
∂U
∂zi
(z) dz. In [x, x + 1]n, U is equal to v(x) plus the Choquet integral Cµx
w.r.t. capacity µx defined by µx(S) = v((x + 1)S , x−S) − v(x) for every S ⊆ N . By
[14],
∫
[0,1]n
∂Cµx
∂zi
(z) dz = φShi (µx). Hence
Impi(U) =
∑
x∈{0,...,k−1}N
φShi (µx). (7)
We then obtain the following result.
Lemma 1. If U is the Choquet integral w.r.t. k-ary capacity v, then Impi(U) = φi(v).
Hence the counterpart of φi on continuous domains is the integrated local importance.
6 Related works
There have been many proposed values for multichoice games, e.g., Hsiao and Ragha-
van [11], van den Nouweland et al. [19], Klijn et al. [13], Peters and Zank [15] and
Grabisch and Lange [10]. We present in this section the Shapley value defined by Hsiao
and Raghavan, Peters and Zank, and Grabisch and Lange. All of them satisfy the clas-
sical efficiency axiom and thus differ from our value.
The first extension of the Shapley value was introduced by Hsiao and Raghavan
[11]. They defined the Shapley value using weights for all possible actions of the play-
ers, thereby extending ideas of weighted Shapley values (cf. [12]). The value proposed
by Hsiao and Raghavan is based on unanimity games. They propose the following def-
inition:
∀x ∈ L \ 0N , φij(ux) =
{ wj∑
i∈N wxi
, if j = xi
0, otherwise
where w1 . . . , wk are the weights of actions 1, . . . , k, such that w1 < . . . < wk . Fur-
thermore, the value is determined by
φ(v) =
∑
x∈L
x 6=0N
mv(x)φ(ux), ∀v ∈ G(L),
wheremv is the Mo¨bius transform of v.
The axiomatic of Peters and Zank [15] is also based on unanimity games. They
proposed the following multi-choice Shapley value,
φij(v) =
∑
x∈L
xi=j
mv(x)
s(x)
, ∀v ∈ G(L).
Grabisch and Lange [10] did not use unanimity games, but took an axiomatic ap-
proach to define a Shapley value in a more general context for games over lattices. They
define the Shapley value for multichoice game as follows,
φi(v) =
∑
x−i∈Γ (L−i)
(n− k(x−i)− 1)!k(x−i)!
n!
(v(x−i, ki)− v(x−i, 0i)).
7 Conclusion and related works
We have proposed a new importance index for k-ary games. It quantifies the impact of
each attribute on the overall utility. According to the linearity, dummy player, symmetry
and invariance properties, φi(v) takes the form of the sum over x ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}
N
of a value over the restriction of the k-ary game on ×i∈N{xi, xi + 1} (see (7)). In our
construction, the value at an elementary cell×i∈N{xi, xi+1} corresponds to the usual
Shapley value. We will explore in future work the possibility of the use of other values
such as the Banzhaf value. We will also investigate other indices φi which measure the
impact in absolute value of attribute i. In this case, φi(δy) is not equal to zero when
0 < yi < k.
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